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Abstract
We consider the problem of distance bounding verification (DBV), where a proving party claims a distance and a verifying
party ensures that the prover is within the claimed distance. Current approaches to “secure” distance estimation use signal’s time
of flight, which requires the verifier to have an accurate clock. We study secure DBV using physical channel properties as an
alternative to time measurement. We consider a signal propagation environment that attenuates signal as a function of distance,
and then corrupts it by an additive noise.
We consider three attacking scenarios against DBV, namely distance fraud (DFA), mafia fraud (MFA) and terrorist fraud (TFA)
attacks. We show it is possible to construct efficient DBV protocols with DFA and MFA security, even against an unbounded adver-
sary; on the other hand, it is impossible to design TFA-secure protocols without time measurement, even with a computationally-
bounded adversary. We however provide a TFA-secure construction under the condition that the adversary’s communication
capability is limited to the bounded retrieval model (BRM). We use numerical analysis to examine the communication complexity
of the introduced DBV protocols. We discuss our results and give directions for future research.
Keywords. Distance Bounding Verification, Noisy Channel, Information-Theoretic Security, Bounded Retrieval Model
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a server machine that aims to provide its clients with different services based on how close they are to the server
location: There are l distinct distances d1 < · · · < dl as well as services S1, . . . , Sl such that a client is eligible for service
Si (and all Sj for j ≥ i) if and only if he is located at a distance ≤ di. To receive a service Si, the client simply sends a
corresponding service request to the server; this can be alternatively viewed as the client claiming a distance at most di. The
problem is how the server should make sure the request is eligible, i.e., the client is within distance di. This becomes more
challenging if the server is deployed in a hostile environment, where malicious requests are likely to be received. We refer to
this problem as distance bounding verification (DBV) as it involves the server (also called verifier) “verifying” an upper bound
on its distance to the client (also called prover). The DBV problem captures various real-life scenarios in practice. Imagine for
example a campus center that provides services such as remote printing, online library access, parking reservation depending
on how close the client is to the center. A more practical scenario is location-based services for mobile devices [22], which
provide their costumers with rewards and benefits when they check-in at certain venues.
Despite the variety of the settings, “secure” distance estimation approaches often rely on signal’s time of flight (ToF)
[3] since other signal properties, such as received signal strength (RSS) and angle of arrival (AoA) are much susceptible to
different powerful attack adversaries. ToF-based distance estimation is achieved through a rapid exchange of challenge-response
messages between the verifier and the prover. For each challenge-response, the verifier measures the round-trip time, subtracts
the processing time of the prover, and divides this by the signal traveling speed to have an estimate of its distance to the
prover.
Accurate time measurements in these protocols introduce implementation challenges [20]. Firstly, the verifier needs access
to a high-precision clock to be able to measure the round-trip time with sufficient accuracy, since a small error leads to a
large inaccuracy in distance estimates. Secondly, the verifier either needs a good estimate of the prover’s processing time, or
must assume it is negligible compared to signal’s time of flight. In hostile environments, one cannot make a good estimate of
the adversary’s processing time and this may result in large errors in distance estimation. This indicates that the design and
implementation of accurate ToF-based DBV protocols is still a challenge. This concern leads us to the following question:
Q: Is secure DBV possible without using time measurement?
We address the above question and initiate the study of secure DBV in circumstances where the verifier does not have access
to an accurate clock and so cannot use ToF-based solutions. We investigate using physical-layer channel properties, namely
path-loss and noise, as an alternative resource to time of flight for the purpose of distance bounding verification. Our approach
can be seen as a security enhancement of RSS-based distance estimation methods, which assume the prover honestly reports
back the signal power it receives from the verifier. Knowing this power together with the channel loss as a function of distance,
the verifier can obtain its distance to the prover. This solution however is not suitable when the prover reports a fake power.
We alternatively propose using the combination of path-loss and noise properties in order to relate distance estimation to the
signal-to-noise ratio (which in turn connects to bit-error rate) at the receiver. This is the reason why for instance our wireless
device cannot receive the wifi signals of a router when we are not within its transmission range, simply because signal is much
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weaker than noise. In this paper, we analyze this more formally and investigate how we can use these physical properties to
achieve provable security in DBV protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to formalize distance bounding
verification using channel loss and noise.
A. Problem description
A DBV protocol is initiated by the prover (say located at distance dr) sending a request for a service Sc that corresponds to
a distance dc. Due to this correspondence between the service and the distance claim, throughout the paper, we alternatively
say that the prover sends a distance claim dc.
The protocol proceeds in a number of communication rounds thereafter that let the verifier accept or reject the request (or
claim) by deciding whether dr ≤ dc. We assume that the prover and the verifier communicate over a wireless environment that
attenuates the transmitted signal and adds noise to it. In our setting, signal attenuation is a deterministic variable that reduces
as a function of distance and noise is modeled by an additive Gaussian random variable with zero mean and certain variance.
We refer to this propagation environment as the Path Loss and Additive Noise (PLAN) model.
A secure DBV protocol should ideally allow the verifier to accept if and only if the prover’s real distance is closer than
the claimed distance (dr ≤ dc). This not practically achievable however, as it infeasible to distinguish much close distances,
one closer and one farther than dc (e.g., dc +  and dc −  for small ). We here relax the ideal requirement of perfectly
distinguishing between the above two distance regions (i.e., dr ≤ dc and dr > dc) by including some uncertainty gaps. In this
work, we use a real-valued parameter ψ > 1, referred to as DBV ratio, for this relaxation. The knowledge of ψ together with the
claimed distance dc lets the verifier specify two distance regions dr ≤ dc and dr ≥ ψdc corresponding to the honest and attack
scenarios, for which the protocol is expected to accept and reject, respectively. For a prover in the region, dc < dr < ψdc,
the protocol may accept or reject, with probabilities that will depend on the implementation. For a service provider this region
can be seen as allowing “free riders” with some probability. For high-precision distance bounding, it is possible to make the
region arbitrarily narrow by choosing ψ sufficiently close to 1.
The performance of a DBV protocol is measured via false rejection probability, FR, in an honest scenario and false acceptance
probability, FA, in an attack scenario. We study three main types of attacks (i.e., scenarios where dr ≥ ψdc) against DBV
protocols. Distance fraud attack (DFA) [3] refers to a scenario where a malicious prover claims a distance that is lower than
its actual distance. Mafia fraud attack (MFA) [9] is a man-in-the-middle attack where an intruding attacker positions itself
between the verifier and an honest prover to claim that the prover is closer. In terrorist fraud attack (TFA) [9], a malicious
prover colludes with an intruder who is close to the verifier in order to convince the verifier that the prover is closer than it
really is; the intruder, however, does not have the secret key of the dishonest prover. We call a DBV protocol secure against
an attack scenario if it has small false rejection probability in the honest scenario, and small false acceptance probability in
that attack scenario.
B. Outline of results
The intuition is that signal attenuation and noise can be used to distinguish points at different distances without resorting to
time measurement. In particular, for a distance claim dc, the verifier may be able to distinguish between the honest and the
attack scenarios if it can send signals that behave differently at distances up to dc, compared to distances greater than ψdc.
This is naturally true because the signal to noise ratio (SNR) at the prover’s receiver degrades as the prover moves father than
dc. We use a very simple challenge-response protocol where the verifier sends a random binary-string challenge and accepts
if and only if the prover’s response is close enough (in Hamming weight) to the challenge.
1) DFA-secure DBV protocol: We give a DFA-secure protocol by simply using the above challenge-response phase, where
the k-bit challenge is transmitted over the PLAN environment via the binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation. The BPSK
modulation is power-adjustable, i.e., for a received distance claim dc, the verifier chooses an appropriate transmission power
E for the modulator such that they are received (demodulated) with at most βk errors at distances ≤ dc and with more than
βk errors at distances ≥ ψdc. By choosing k and β carefully and letting E be an appropriate function of dc, the verifier can
stay with the same challenge length k and threshold rate 0 < β < 1 for all claims, by modulator changing E accordingly.
2) Adding MFA-security to DBV: MFA-security for a DBV protocol can be easily achieved by authenticating messages
between the prover and the verifier, so that they cannot be manipulated by a third-party attacker. This means protection against
MFA is purely cryptographic and does not use the physical properties of the channel. This is totally different from the DB
setting [3], where a mafia fraud attacker can activate a passive prover device by relaying (without changing) the verifier’s
challenge signal. Such relay attacks do not work against DBV protocols because DBV is initiated by the “prover” who would
reject any incoming message before it sends a message (distance claim). Our DFA-secure DBV protocol can hence be changed
to a DFA/MFA-secure protocol by simply using a message authentication code (MAC) for communicated messages.
3) TFA-security and the bounded retrieval model: Our DBV solutions cannot resist TFA, because the malicious prover can
always have a helping intruder at distance dc relay the challenge (by error-correcting codes or signal amplification) to distance
dr ≥ ψdc. Unfortunately without putting further restrictive assumptions, such an attack succeeds, irrespective of the adversary’s
computational power, against any DBV protocol that does not use time-of-flight information. The reason is an appropriately
located intruder can relay all protocol messages (including any signal-related information) back and forth between the other
the prover and the verifier, without the verifier noticing.
We adopt a restriction on the adversary’s communication capability that will allow for TFA-secure DBV protocols without
time measurement. We consider a variation of the bounded retrieval model (BRM) [10], [12], described as follows. There is
a high throughput uniform source, called the BRM source, that can be invoked by the verifier. The source generates an n-bit
uniform binary string and transmits it with a high speed such that all parties (including the verifier) can only retrieve a constant
fraction, λ, of the string. Such a source can be implemented for instance by an “explosion” process which generates a lot of
information that cannot be fully retrieved and stored [8]. Using the BRM source output as the challenge message potentially
protects the DBV protocol against TFA since it does not let the intruder capture “all” the transmitted challenge and relay it
to the farther prover. We design a BRM-DBV protocol that uses appropriate primitives to guarantee that the collusion of the
intruder and the prover cannot make them succeed in deceiving the verifier. We analyze the security of our protocol against
two types of adversaries, namely sampling adversary and general adversary, depending on the adversary’s retrieval capability.
The sampling adversary is a practical framework in the BRM and allows for sampling individual bit. In contrast, the general
adversary is a theoretically interesting setting that does not consider any limitation on the adversary’s retrieving function other
than its length.
4) Numerical analysis: The introduced DBV protocols use computationally-efficient functions such as Hamming distance
calculation, MACs, and samplers. The communication cost (number of communicated bits) of each protocol, however, depends
on ψ, FA, FR, λ, and the environment parameters. We use numerical analysis to examine the performance of these protocols
with respect to the above parameters. MFA/DFA security and TFA-security against sampling adversaries (in the BRM) can be
attained for all input parameters, while TFA-security against general adversaries is achievable only for a certain range of the DB
ratio ψ and the retrieval rate λ (more details in Section V-B). Furthermore, DFA/MFA-security is achieved by communicating
a few hundred bits for typical parameters, which is reasonable for ordinary communication devices, whereas TFA-security
against sampling adversary requires more communication bits, which varies depending on ψ and λ.
C. Discussion
1) Practicality of the results: This work provides an interesting approach to DFA/MFA-secure DBV in real-life communi-
cation scenarios and without requiring additional hardware for time measurement. Our DFA/MFA-secure DBV protocol has
low computational and communication cost and can be implemented on communication devices with low-cost transceivers,
e.g., cell phones, laptops, etc. The growing area of location-based services for mobile devices [22] gives a good example
where DFA-secure DBV is required, for when malicious clients launch a distance fraud by cheating on their location claim
(via manipulating with the GPS information) [14] in order to receive illegitimate services/rewards.
The results for the bounded retrieval model (BRM) provide an example of adversary’s restriction that makes TFA-secure
DBV without time measurement possible. A similar work to this is the study of BRM in position based cryptography [8].
Proposing more realistic models for designing secure distance bounding without time measurement is an interesting open
question.
2) Channel noise versus time of flight: This work inquires the physical properties of a natural propagation environment as
an alternative to time measurement for DBV. Despite construction of protocols with security against the main known attacks
in our setting, time of flight has some clear advantages: It does not depend on the characteristics of the environment and is
superior when protection against TFA is considered. In return, a main advantage of our approach is that its performance does
not depend on the computation time required by the prover. This advantage lets proposed solutions work for verification of
very short distances, provided that the precise channel state information (attenuation and noise model) is derived.
An interesting open question is if one can combine physical channel properties with time measurement to achieve better
performance, for instance to reduce the required clock accuracy of time-based protocols without sacrificing security.
3) The environmental assumptions: We have made two main assumptions in this work. Firstly, we modeled signal propagation
environment by a widely-accepted, yet simple model that includes signal attenuation and additive Gaussian noise. We note this
assumption is mainly for the simplicity of analysis. Modifying the analysis, similar results can be derived for more complex
communication models, e.g., Reighley fading channels that cause the signal-to-noise ratios to become random variables.
Secondly, although we did not make any assumption on the computation power of the adversary, we did assume that she
has the same reception power as the honest prover. One can relax this assumption and consider a more powerful device for the
adversary: Secure DBV under this condition can still be possible for higher DBV ratio ψ, implying a larger uncertainty gap.
4) From DBV to DB protocols: It is quite important to know whether our DBV protocols can be used to build secure DB
protocols that do not require the prover to know its distance, i.e., expect the protocol to output a verified distance bound. We do
not treat this problem formally, but here are a few words on this topic. Assuming that the protocol should estimate a distance
bound from a limited number of distances, say d1 to dl for some small l, distance bounding can be obtained by repeating a
DBV protocol (with carefully chosen parameters) for all these values in place of the distance claim and outputs the smallest i
such that the claim di is verified via DBV. This approach provides distance bounding with security against distance fraud, but
not mafia fraud since a relay man-in-the middle attack becomes irresistible. We note that this approach achieves MFA- and
TFA-security in the bounded retrieval model.
5) Single-session versus multiple-session DBV: We study single-session DBV protocols against computationally unbounded
adversaries. For multiple-session use, the protocols will use fresh randomness and key information in each execution. This will
ensure that the adversary’s gained information in one session cannot be used in other sessions. For more efficiency in secret
key size, one can assume computationally bounded adversary and use computationally-secure cryptographic primitives.
D. Related work
Various approaches have been proposed to obtain location information of untrusted parties in a communication network.
Brands and Chaum [3] proposed distance bounding (DB) as a primitive that determines a distance upper-bound to a proving
party. They introduced a time-based DB protocol that is secure against DFA and MFA. The follow-up work has since considered
different formalizations of the DB problem in various settings and provided protocols with security against TFA and more
advanced attack scenarios (cf. [4], [6], [11], [13], [15], [20], [27]) Location verification is another primitive that uses distance
estimation techniques to allow the verifier to check whether the proving party is inside a certain region [21]. Both distance
bounding and location verification have found numerous applications in security: they are used as building blocks for secure
localization [5], location-based access control [19], and position-based cryptography [8].
Although the main body of the work relies on time measurement for secure distance estimation, there have been attempts
to find alternative secure solutions without using time. Balfanz et al. [1] investigated the use of location-limited channels
for location verification. Caswell and Debaty [7] proposed obtaining proximity information via the concept of physically-
constrained channels. These studies however do not provide a “formal” security analysis that shows how physical properties
are used to realize these channel models.
The effect of environment noise on time-based DB protocols has been considered by [13], [17], [23]. These works approach
noise as an undesired phenomenon that interferes with a DB protocol’s operation; hence the work proposes protection
mechanisms against environmental noise. In our contrasting viewpoint, the channel noise is a “blessing” in the sense that
it allows to distinguish honest and distance fraud scenarios based on the reception quality at different distances.
Paper organization
Section II presents our notations and preliminary definitions. In Section III, we give a formal definition of the DBV problem
and settings. We introduce our DBV protocols and prove their security in Section IV, and use numerical analysis to study their
communication complexity in Section V. We conclude the paper and give directions to future work in Section VI.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We use uppercase letters X and lowercase letters x to denote random variables/strings and their realizations, respectively.
Xi denotes the i-th element of the string X . For a positive integer n, we use [n] to indicate {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote Hamming
distance of two bit strings by dH(., .). All logarithms are base 2.
The basic component of our DBV protocols is a challenge-response phase over the noisy environment that lets the verifier
accept only if the prover’s response is close enough (in Hamming distance) to the challenge. The intuition for security is
that receivers at far distances, with high probability, cannot guess a close string to the challenge. We formalize this notion of
security through a class of sources, named closely-secure sources, which generalize weak sources by requiring an upper-bound
on the probability of any element being close to the source output.
Definition 1 (Closely-secure source): A random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n is (β, δ)-closely-secure if maxx Pr(dH(X,x) ≤
βn) ≤ 2−δn. The source is (β, δ)-closely-secure conditioned on Y ∈ Y if Ey maxx Pr(dH(X,x) ≤ βn|Y = y) ≤ 2−δn.
Lemma 1 shows how leakage can affect the close-security of a source. The proof of this lemma follows simply from the chain
rule for min-entropy and hence omitted.
Lemma 1: Let the random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n be (µ, δ)-closely-secure conditioned on Y and let A be any random variable
with support size L. Then X is (µ, δ − log(L)/n)-closely-secure conditioned on (Y,A).
To protect DBV against mafia fraud, we use (information-theoretic) message authentication codes (MACs). A MAC is a
shared key cryptographic primitive that protects a message against arbitrary tampering of an adversary. The code is defined by
a function Mac : K×M→ T that takes a shared key sk ∈ K as well as a message m ∈M and returns an authentication tag
t = Mac(sk;m). A message and tag pair (m′, t′) are then verified if t′ = Mac(sk;m′) holds. We limit ourselves to one-time
MACs, defined as follows.
Definition 2 (MAC): A function Mac : K×M→ T is called an -secure one-time message authentication code (MAC) if for
any message m ∈M and any adversary A : T →M×T , it holds that Pr[t′ = Mac(SK;m′)|(m′, t′) = A(Mac(SK;m))] ≤ ,
with the probability taken over the uniform key SK ∈ K.
Another primitive used in this work is a sampler, which is an efficiently-computable function that receives some randomness
as input and lets the BRM-DBV protocol retrieve part of the BRM source output in the BRM setting. For the purpose of this
work, we use averaging samplers that are proposed due to their randomness efficiency [2], [25].
Definition 3 (Averaging sampler): [25] A function Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]k is a (µ, θ, γ) averaging sampler if for ev-
ery function f : [n] → [0, 1] with average value 1n
∑
i f(i) ≥ µ, it holds that Pr
(
1
k
∑k
j=1 f(ij) < µ− θ
)
< γ, where
(i1, i2, . . . , ik) = Samp(Ur) and Ur is uniform over {0, 1}r. The sampler has distinct samples if for every x ∈ {0, 1}r, the
samples produced by Samp(x) are all distinct.
Vadhan [25] shows an explicit efficient construction for averaging sampling with distinct samples (as defined above), by
modifying an existing sampler based on random walks on expander graphs. We show in Lemma 2 that averaging samplers
keep the close-security property of a source as in Definition 1. This property is useful in proving the TFA-security of our
BRM-DBV protocol.
Lemma 2 (See Appendix A): Let the random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n be (µ, δ)-closely-secure conditioned on Y . Suppose
Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]k is a (µ, θ, γ)-averaging sampler with distinct samples. Then for uniformly distributed Ur ∈ {0, 1}r,
the random variable M = XSamp(Ur) is (µ− θ, δ′)-closely-secure conditioned on (Ur, Y ), where δ′ = log(γ + 2−δn)/k.
III. DBV: PROBLEM DEFINITION
A distance bounding verification (DBV) protocol is a two-party protocol between a verifier V and a (possibly untrusted)
prover P that enables the verifier to verify an upper-bound on distance claim by the prover. The protocol is initiated by V
receiving a distance claim dc supposedly sent by P whose real distance is dr. The protocol may have multiple rounds. In each
round, one of the parties constructs a message using its current view of the protocol, including its secret state and the messages
received so far. At the end of the protocol the verifier outputs a Boolean value Vout ∈ {Acc, Rej} indicating V has accepted
or rejected the claim, respectively.
We denote by d0 the maximum distance that can be claimed in the DBV protocol and by ψ > 1 a real-valued parameter,
called the DBV ratio. A distance claim dc ≤ d0 together with ψ partitions the area around V into three distance regions: (i)
dr ≤ dc, (ii) dc < dr < ψdc, and (iii) dr ≥ ψdc. See Figure 1. Region (i) that is the closest to V corresponds to the honest
setting, denoted by Hon[V ↔ P], where V is expected to output Acc. Region (iii) which is the farthest from V corresponds
to an adversarial setting Att , where V should output Rej. Region (ii) between the other two regions specifies an uncertain
region where the protocol’s output cannot be guaranteed. The acceptance probability of V in this region decreases with distance
from 1 to 0. To keep the uncertainty region small, the DBV ratio ψ should be chosen sufficiently close to 1.
Verifier
dc
ψdc
d0
Honest region
Uncertainty
region
Adversarial region
Fig. 1. The DBV regions specified by dc and ψ.
The performance of a DBV protocol is measured in terms of completeness and soundness using the two false rejection and
false acceptance error rates, respectively.
Definition 4 (DBV protocol): A DBV protocol is called a (ψ, FA, FR)-Att -secure, when it satisfies
Completeness: Pr(Vrfout(Hon[V↔ P]) = Acc) ≥ 1− FR, (1)
Soundness: Pr(Vrfout(Att) = Rej) ≥ 1− FA, (2)
with probability taken over the randomness of the protocol, the adversary, and the environment.
A. Adversarial scenarios
We assume that the DBV protocol, its parameters and implementation, are publicly known. The adversary can listen to and
tamper arbitrarily with the communicated messages. We consider the following adversarial scenarios against a DBV protocol.
We note that an adversarial scenario always refers to when dr ≥ ψdc, where ψ > 1 is the DBV ratio.
Distance fraud attack (DFA) [3]. The distance fraud, denoted by DFA[V↔ P], refers to a scenario where a dishonest prover
P at distance dr claims distance dc, such that dr ≥ ψdc, to the verifier aiming at convincing V of this claim.
Mafia fraud attack (MFA) [9]. The Mafia fraud, MFA[V ↔ I ↔ P], consists of three parties: an honest verifier V, an honest
prover P at the distance dr, and an intruder I who launches a man-in-the-middle attack. No restriction is put on the location
of I. The attack begins with P sending an honest distance claim and I modifying it to a claim dc, where dr ≥ ψdc. The
rest of the attack is about I trying to convince V about this claim. Protection against MFA requires P and V to share secret
key information by which V can distinguish P from I. We note that unlike in DB protocols [3], I cannot succeed if it just
relays messages between V and P as the first message in this attack scenario against DBV is an honest distance claim, i.e.,
the prover’s real distance.
Terrorist Fraud Attack (TFA) [9]. The terrorist fraud, denoted by TFA[V ↔ I ↔ P], also includes three parties: an honest
verifier V, a malicious prover P at the distance dr, a colluding intruder I that can be at any location. Similar to MFA-security,
TFA-security also relies on secret key information shared between V and P. The prover’s goal is to help I convince V of
the distance claim dc where dr ≥ ψdc, nevertheless without revealing crucial secret key information that would increase I’s
success chance in impersonating the prover without its permission. An impersonation attack, denoted by Imp[V↔ A], refers
to a scenario where an adversary A initiates a DBV protocol with V by sending a distance claim dc, while the prover at some
distance dr ≥ ψdc is unaware of this protocol initiation.
Du¨rholz et al. [11] provide a formalization of the above requirement in TFA for time-based DB protocols. The definition
however is given for multiple-session DB in the computational setting and cannot be applied to our setting of information-
theoretic “single-session” time-less DBV. In our setting, the prover’s secret key is used for “one” DBV protocol instance: Once
an honest/attack DBV scenario is successfully completed, then the prover’s secret key can be made public since it will become
useless. However, the prover should not reveal its key prior to any protocol because it would let others impersonate the prover.
Having noted this, we modify the formalization in [11] to define terrorist fraud as follows:
In a valid TFA, P may reveal any information V to I as long as it does not result impersonation of P to be a more attractive
attack (having higher success chance). We note that this leakage to I should be examined at a time before V “receives” the
TFA distance claim dc, because after this moment V would reject any claims impersonating the prover; hence, rendering the
leakage information V useless. But if leakage occurs before V receives the claim dc (say e.g., offline), the intruder may try
to launch an impersonation attack instantly to claim a closer distance d′c  dc, which corresponds to a higher-ranked service.
Definition 5 formalizes this by requiring that I’s view by the time the distance claim is received by V does not increase its
success chance in impersonation attack.
Definition 5: Let TFA[V↔ I↔ P] be an attack scenario that provides I with view V before V receives the distance claim.
This attack scenario is a valid TFA if for any impersonator A that takes V as input, there exists a simulator S such that
Pr(Vrfout(Imp[V, S(⊥)]) = Acc) = Pr(Vrfout(Imp[V,A(V )]) = Acc).
B. Physical-layer model: PLAN
We consider an environment where wireless signal transmission is affected by Path Loss and Additive Noise (PLAN). We
assume long-distance path loss without fading, in which signal amplitude at a distance d from the transmitter is obtained by
dividing the signal transmission amplitude by
√
ξdα, where ξ ≥ 1 is a constant representing the system loss and α > 0 is
the path loss exponent whose value varies between 2 (free-space) and 4 (flat-earth) [18, Chapter 4]. The additive noise is a
Gaussian signal with zero mean and variance Σ. Thus in our model, a signal transmitted with the initial power E will be
received at a distance d with power Eξdα . We specify a PLAN communication environment by PLAN
ξ,α,Σ where the three
superscript parameters denote the system loss, the path loss exponent, and the noise power, respectively.
Sender
Intended receiver
Blocked receiver
X
Y
Z
1√
(ξdα) Ny(0, σy)
1√
ξ(ψd)α Nz(0, σz)
d
ψd
Fig. 2. The PLANξ,α,Σ model
Remark 1: We assume that the noise variables at distinct receiving positions in PLANξ,α,Σ are independent. This is a very
common assumption supported by the fact that the additive noise variables at different receivers are generated by independent
sources [24], [26].
Figure 2 models the transmission of a signal X over PLANξ,α,Σ, where intended and blocked receivers at distances d and
ψd, for ψ > 1, receive signals Y = (ξdα)−0.5X + Ny and Z = (ξ(ψd)α)
−0.5
X + Nz , respectively, where Ny and Nz are
independent Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance Σ. For signal transmission power E, the signal-to-noise
ratios at the two receivers are calculated as SNRy = EξdαΣ and SNRz =
E
ξ(ψd)αΣ = SNRy/ψ
α, respectively.
IV. DBV PROTOCOLS OVER PLAN
A. DFA-secure DBV protocol
We give our basic DFA-secure DBV protocol as a challenge-response protocol which relies on power-adjustable Binary
Phase Shift Key (BPSK) modulation for the purpose of signal transmission. Applying the BPSK modulation over the PLAN
environment converts it to a binary symmetric broadcast channel (BSBC) with known bit error probabilities. The challenge-
response protocol is then communicated over this binary channel.
1) BPSK modulation: We use a power-adjustable BPSK modulation scheme with modulator ModE : {0, 1} → R and
demodulator Demod : R→ {0, 1} defined as
ModE(s) =
{
−√E, if s = 0√
E, if s = 1
, and
Demod(x) =
{
0, if x < 0
1, else
, (3)
where E is the transmission power chosen by the verifier. Let Emax be the maximum allowed power at the transmitter,
and d0 be the maximum distance that can be claimed to V. For a target distance d, the verifier chooses E =
(
d
d0
)α
E0,
where E0 ≤ Emax is the power considered for d0. With a slight abuse of notation, we also use ModE/Demod functions for
sequences, by which we mean applying them on symbols sequentially.
The benefit of using power-adjustable modulation over PLANξ,α,Σ is that it gives fixed signal-to-noise ratios SNR0 and
SNR0/ψ
α for all pairs of intended/blocked distances (d, ψd), where SNR0 = E0Σξdα0 is a constant determined by the system
parameters. This implies that all such pairs of channels can be mapped to a single binary symmetric broadcast channel (BSBC)
as shown in Lemma 3. The proof is simple and hence omitted for lack of space.
Lemma 3: Using ModE/Demod over PLANξ,α,Σ converts channels from the verifier V to distances d and ψd into a BSBC
with intended and blocked receiver error probabilities
pi =
1
2
erfc(
√
SNR0) and pb =
1
2
erfc(
√
SNR0
ψα
), (4)
where SNR0 = E0Σξdα0 .
2) Challenge-response protocol: The challenge-response protocol takes advantage of noise in the PLANξ,α,Σ environment
to distinguish whether a claim belongs to an honest scenario or a distance fraud scenario. For positive integer k and real
E0 ≤ Emax and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the (E0, k, β)-challenge-response protocol, Π1, is described as follows.
1) P sends a distance claim [dc] reliably to V.
2) V chooses a random M ∈ {0, 1}k, and broadcasts X = ModE(M), where E = (dc/d0)αE0; P receives Y .
3) P demodulates and sends Mˆ = Demod(Y ) reliably to V .
- Verification. V accepts iff dH(Mˆ,M) ≤ βk.
Remark 2: Notice the difference between communication from the prover to the verifier and that in the opposite direction.
The verifier transmits the challenge via BPSK modulation with appropriate power to cause distinguishably different signal-to-
noise ratios between acceptable distances dr ≤ dc and fraud distances dr ≥ ψdc. Since the prover is generally not trusted, the
protocol does not rely on the communication noise/attenuation in prover-to-verifier messages. The protocol expects the prover
to use reliable coding and reasonable transmission power to provide reliable communication; hence without loss of generality,
we assume this communication is error-free.
A (E0, k, β)-challenge-response protocol is a (ψ, FA, FR)-DFA-secure DBV protocol if for any claim dc ≤ d0, no more
than βk challenge bits are corrupted at distances ≤ dc, and more than βk challenge bits are corrupted at distance ≥ ψdc,
except with probabilities FR and FA, respectively.
Proposition 1 (See Appendix B): Given DBV parameters ψ, FA, and FR, and PLANξ,α,Σ parameters, choose E0 ≤ Emax
and pi ≤ β ≤ pb, where pi and pb are determined from (4). The (E0, k, β)-challenge-response protocol, Π1, with challenge
length
k ≥ dmax{ (pi + β) ln(1/FR)
(β − pi)2 ,
(2pb) ln(1/FA)
(pb − β)2 }e, (5)
is a (ψ, FA, FR)-DFA-secure DBV protocol over PLANξ,α,Σ.
B. Adding MFA-security to DBV
To make a DBV protocol against mafia fraud, one can simply use message authentication for the communicated messages.
This makes an intruder I not able to manipulate with the communication, especially the prover P’s distance claim which is true
(honest) in the MFA scenario. Again note that a relay attack cannot succeed against DBV because the protocol is initiated by
the honest P whose claim is not what I would desire. This is completely different from the distance bounding problem where P
waits to be activated/challenged by the verifier V, through a signal that can be relayed I. As we consider information-theoretic
security for our protocol, we use information-theoretic message authentication code (MAC), given by Definition 2. Figure 3
shows a DFA/MFA-secure DBV protocol, Π2, which is obtained by incorporating an -secure one-time MAC (with  ≤ FA)
to P’s response in the protocol Π1 of Section IV-A. We denote the MAC function by Mac : Ka × ({0, 1}n × D) → T and
assume V and P share a secret key SKa ∈ Ka. The communication, shown in brackets, from P to V is assumed to error-free
(see Remark 2).
Verifier (SK) Prover (SK)
ψ, FA, FR
⇓
E0, k, β
[dc]
dc =⇒ E
M ←R {0, 1}k
X = ModE(M)
X / Y
Mˆ = Demod(Y )
T = Mac(SK; (Mˆ, dc))
[Mˆ, T ]
Vrfout = Acc, iff:
diff(Mˆ,M) ≤ βk and
T = Mac(SK; (Mˆ, dc))
Fig. 3. DFA/MFA-secure DBV protocol Π2
Corollary 1: Let parameters (E0, k, β) be chosen as in Proposition 1 and Mac be an -secure one-time MAC with  ≤ FA.
The DBV protocol Π2 is (ψ, FA, FR)-DFA/MFA-secure over PLANξ,α,Σ.
C. Adding TFA-security to DBV
We observe that without assuming any restriction on the communication capability of P and I, it is impossible to design a TFA-
secure DBV protocol that does not rely on time measurement on the verifier’s side. This can be seen by noting that the channel
between P and I can be made error-free (by using error correcting codes) and instantaneous (without time measurement). The
appropriately located intruder can “relay” all protocol messages (and other related signal information) back and forth between
P and V, without V noticing. Such an attack scenario does not require I to know any secret key information owned by P and
is thus a valid terrorist fraud as in Definition 5.
1) The bounded retrieval model: Protecting against terrorist fraud in DBV may be possible if restrictive assumptions are
made about the adversary’s communication power. In the following, we describe a variant of the bounded retrieval model
(BRM) that restricts the communication capability of the parties in the system. BRM is a variation of bounded storage model
first proposed in [16]. In both cases there is a random source that generates strings with high min-entropy. Bounded storage
model puts a bound on the amount of parties’ storage. In BRM however [10], [12], there is no limit on the parties storage,
rather the adversary’s retrieval rate of the stored strings is limited.
BRM source. We assume there is a λ-BRM source, denoted by Srcλ, that takes as input a transmission power E, generates
a uniform n-bit string O, and transmits XO = ModE(O) using the BPSK modulator. We assume that the verifier V can
select the transmission power, but has no control over the source output. The retrieval rate 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 implies that each party
(including V) can retrieve at most λn bits from the string. Honest parties use sampling to retrieve λn individual bits. The
adversary however may or may not have more communication capability. A sampling adversary, like honest parties, can only
retrieve individual bits at specific indices. But a general adversary can apply any λn-bit function to her observation. While
the latter adversary is more powerful, the sampling adversary is reasonably interesting as one may argue that the applying any
function other than sampling would require retrieving more bits from observation and hence would violate the BRM condition.
Practical examples of implementing such a source is an “explosion” which generates a lot of noise that can be measured but
not stored [8] or a system of high-speed transceivers that broadcast random data at a very high rate over the environment.
2) The BRM-DBV Protocol: We describe the BRM-DB protocol Π3 that is DFA/MFA/TFA-secure in the BRM. We assume
that V and P share a key SKe ∈ {0, 1}r that is used for sampling the BRM source output.
Averaging sampler. We use “averaging sampler” Samp, given by Definition 3. This primitive takes as input a secret key SKe
shared between V and P and returns them k = λn positions to sample from the BRM source output.
The reason for TFA-security is that the challenge in the BRM-DB protocol is hidden in the BRM source output and retrieving
it needs SKe. Without the key knowledge, the intruder can only retrieve a random part of the source output, which cannot help
much the (malicious) prover find an acceptable response. The protocol proceeds in three rounds as shown in Figure 4 (again
the communication from P to V is error-free).
1) P sends a distance claim [dc] reliably to V.
2) V invokes the source Srcλ(E) with E =
(
dc
d0
)α
E0; the signal XO ∈ Rn is transmitted and P receives YO.
3) P uses Samp to retrieve YM = YO,Samp(SKe), obtains Mˆ = ModE(YM ), and sends back [Mˆ ].
- Verification. V obtains M = XO,Samp(SKe) and accepts iff dH(Mˆ,M) ≤ βk, for k = λn.
Verifier (SKe) Prover (SKe)
ψ, FA, FR, λ
⇓
E0, k, β, n
[dc]
dc =⇒ E
XO ← Srcλ(E)
XO /
YO
YM = YO,Samp(SKe)
Mˆ = Demod(YM )
[Mˆ ]
XM = XO,Samp(SKe)
M = Demod(XM )
Vrfout = Acc, iff:
dH(Mˆ,M) ≤ βk
Fig. 4. The BRM-DB protocol in the BRM
Theorem 1 shows the TFA-security of the above protocol in the general adversary setting.
Theorem 1 (See Appendix C): Given λ < log(e)/2, DBV parameters ψ, FA, and FR, and PLANξ,α,Σparameters, if there
exists E0 ≤ Emax such that pi < pb −
√
2 ln(2)pbλ, with pi and pb given by Lemma 3, then the following holds. Choose β,
θ, µ, k, n such that pi < β, µ = β + θ, µ < pb −
√
2 ln(2)pbλ,
k ≥ dmax{ (pi + β) ln(1/FR)
(β − pi)2 ,
2pbλ ln(1/(FA − γ))
(pb − µ)2 − 2 ln(2)pbλ}e, (6)
and n = dk/λe. The BRM-DBV protocol Π3 is (ψ, FA, FR)-DFA/MFA/TFA-secure over PLANξ,α,Σin the λ-BRM with general
intruder.
redThe result shows the possibility of TFA-secure distance bounding verification in the BRM. The construction, however,
will only work under the condition that pi < pb −
√
2 ln(2)pbλ. This gives that choosing λ < log(e)/2 ≈ 0.72 is necessary
but not sufficient as satisfying the condition depends on other parameters, esp. the DBV ratio ψ. The numerical analysis of
Section V-A shows that retrieval rate should be are around 0.1, which is much lower that the above bound. In contrast to the
above, the BRM-DBV protocol shows much better security performance in the sampling adversary setting.
Theorem 2 (See Appendix D): Given λ < 1, DBV parameters ψ, FA, and FR, and PLANξ,α,Σparameters, if there exists
E0 ≤ Emax such that pi < (1− λ)pb, with pi and pb given by Lemma 3, the the following holds. Choose β, θ, µ, k, n such
that pi < β, µ = β + θ, µ < (1− λ)pb,
k ≥ dmax{ (pi + β) ln(1/FR)
(β − pi)2 ,
2(1− λ)pb ln(1/(FA − γ))
((1− λ)pb − µ)2 }e, (7)
and n = dk/λe. The BRM-DBV protocol Π3 is (ψ, FA, FR)-DFA/MFA/TFA-secure over PLANξ,α,Σin the λ-BRM with
sampling intruder.
From (4), any arbitrarily small pi/pb is achieved by choosing E0 and hence SNR0 sufficiently large. We however should
note that when Emax is not very large, some values of pi/pb may not be achievable with E0 ≤ Emax (more details in Section
V-B).
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
The DBV protocols Π1, Π2, and Π3 proposed in this work are computationally efficient as they use light-computation
functions such as Hamming distance calculation, a one-time MAC, and an average sampler [25]. The communication cost of
the protocols however, defined as the number of communicated bits, may vary depending on the system parameters ψ, FA,
FR, and λ (for the BRM-DBV protocol).
We study the performance of the introduced DBV protocols with respect to the system parameters, while choosing the
following typical parameters as default: We consider PLANξ,α,Σ environment with no system loss ξ = 1, outdoor path
loss exponent α = 3, and noise power Σ = 1pW ≈ −90dBm. We also let the maximum allowed transmission power be
Emax = 30kW ≈ 75dBm (reasonable for small radio stations), and the maximum allowed distance claim be d0 = 100km,
i.e., any distance claim less than 100km is accepted by the system.
A. DBV protocols Π1 and Π2
For the communication cost, we need to obtain the length of the verifier’s challenge. Given PLANξ,α,Σand DBV parameters
ψ > 1 and 0 < FA, FR ≤ 1, we shall obtain the challenge-response parameters (E∗0 , k∗, β∗) that give a (ψ, FA, FR)-DFA-secure
DBV protocol, while minimizing the required challenge length. We study the behavior of the minimal challenge length k∗
with respect to the DBV protocol parameters (ψ, FA, FR); for simplicity, we assume equal error probabilities FA = FR = .
Following Proposition 1, the optimal challenge-response parameters are determined by minimizing (5) as
k∗ = dln(1/) min
E0≤Emax
min
pi<β<pb
max{ (pi + β)
(β − pi)2
,
(2pb)
(pb − β)2
}e, (8)
and letting E∗0 and β
∗ be choices that result in k∗. Figure 5 graphs the changes in k∗ (in bits) and E∗0 (in dBm) as functions of
1 < ψ ≤ 1.5 for  ∈ {10−3, 10−4, 10−5}. The upper graph shows that k∗ increases by decreasing the DBV ratio ψ; however,
it remains in a reasonable range, e.g., 231 to 2629 bits for ψ from 1.1 to 1.01. The lower graph shows that E∗0 increases
when ψ increases; however, its value does not depend on  as expected from (8). We also note that the optimal choice of
E0 is typically far less than the maximum allowed power Emax = 75dBm. The reason is that increasing E0, increases the
signal-to-noise ratios at both receivers, which do not necessarily minimize (8).
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Fig. 5. Changes in challenge length k∗ and power E∗0 w.r.t. ψ and .
B. DBV protocol Π3 against sampling and general intruders
We follow a similar approach to the previous section to find the minimum n that is required by this protocol in the BRM.
We start by requiring TFA-security against sampling intruder and then discuss about the general intruder case.
1) Sampling intruder: According to Theorem 1, the minimum n is obtained as (by considering θ and γ to be negligible)
n∗ = d 1
λ
ln(1/) min
E0≤Emax
min
pi<β<(1−λ)pb
max{ (pi + β)
(β − pi)2 ,
2(1− λ)pb
((1− λ)pb − β)2 }e. (9)
The above expression for n∗ is very similar to (8) for k∗, except that pb is replaced by (1 − λ)pb and a 1/λ coefficient is
included in the expression. This reveals that the communication complexity of Π3 can be much higher than Π1 (and also Π2).
For small λ, we get (1− λ)pb ≈ pb and increase in the communication complexity is caused by 1/λ factor in (9). For larger
λ, the minimization in (9) results in much higher value than that of (8). Figure 6(a) includes two graphs. The lower graph
shows the maximum BRM rate λ∗ (for which TFA-security against sampling intruder is guaranteed) as a function of the DBV
ratio ψ. When ψ is too small, the TFA-security cannot not hold for all λ’s only because the transmission powers is bounded
by Emax. Of course, by letting Emax be sufficiently large the protocol Π3 will work for all ψ’s and λ’s. The upper graph
illustrates the behavior of n∗ with respect to ψ for λ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. Both increasing λ and decreasing ψ can cause drastic
increase in the length n∗, such that for ψ = 1.06 and λ = 0.9, the BRM source should send around 2 Gigabits of random
data.
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Fig. 6. Changes in source output length n∗ and retrieval rate λ∗ w.r.t. ψ
2) General intruder: For general intruder the results are much restrictive, mainly because Theorem 1 provides security
guarantees only if the set of input parameters satisfy pi < pb −
√
2 ln(2)pbλ, and these cases are quite limited as shown in
Figure 6(b). The lower graph indicates that the BRM rate λ should be too small for TFA-security against general intruder,
e.g., for ψ = 1.68 the rate λ cannot be more than 0.1. The upper graph then draws n∗ as a function of ψ when λ = 0.1: the
numbers suggest that when security guarantee can be provided, the BRM source output length can be reasonably small, e.g.,
n∗ = 1071 for ψ = 1.68.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed the study of distance bounding verification (DBV) using physical channel properties as an alternative resource
to time of flight. We showed practical solutions for DFA and MFA secure DBV. Unfortunately, TFA-secure DBV without
using time measurement is not possible in general; this is evidence to the effectiveness of time of flight for secure distance
estimation purposes. We however proved the possibility of TFA-secure DBV in situations where the bounded retrieval model
can be realized. There are numerous open questions and future research directions that follow from this work. It is a nice
direction to use the noisy environment properties together with time to increase accuracy and/or security of DBV protocols.
Considering practically meaningful restrictions on the attackers to provide security against TFA is also of practical interest.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Balfanz, D. K. Smetters, P. Stewart, and H. C. Wong. Talking to strangers: Authentication in ad-hoc wireless networks. In Proceedings of the 9th
Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), pages 7–19, 2002.
[2] M. Bellare and J. Rompel. Randomness-efficient oblivious sampling. In 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 276 –287,
1994.
[3] S. Brands and D. Chaum. Distance-bounding protocols. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 93, volume 765 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 344–359. 1994.
[4] L. Bussard and W. Bagga. Distance-bounding proof of knowledge to avoid real-time attacks. In Security and Privacy in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing,
volume 181 of IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, pages 223–238. 2005.
[5] S. Cˇapkun, M. Cˇagalj, and M. Srivastava. Secure localization with hidden and mobile base stations. In in Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM. Citeseer,
2006.
[6] S. Capkun and J.-P. Hubaux. Secure positioning in wireless networks. Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, 24(2):221 – 232, 2006.
[7] D. Caswell and P. Debaty. Creating web representations for places. In Handheld and Ubiquitous Computing, pages 255–287. Springer, 2000.
[8] N. Chandran, V. Goyal, R. Moriarty, and R. Ostrovsky. Position based cryptography. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009, volume 5677 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 391–407. 2009.
[9] Y. Desmedt. Major security problems with the “unforgeable” (Feige)-Fiat-Shamir proofs of identity and how to overcome them. In SecuriCom ’88,
pages 15–17, 1998.
[10] G. Di Crescenzo, R. Lipton, and S. Walfish. Perfectly secure password protocols in the bounded retrieval model. In Theory of Cryptography, volume
3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 225–244. 2006.
[11] U. Drholz, M. Fischlin, M. Kasper, and C. Onete. A formal approach to distance-bounding rfid protocols. In Information Security, volume 7001 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 47–62. 2011.
[12] S. Dziembowski. Intrusion-resilience via the bounded-storage model. In Theory of Cryptography, volume 3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 207–224. 2006.
[13] G. Hancke and M. Kuhn. An rfid distance bounding protocol. In First International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in
Communications Networks, SecureComm ’05, pages 67 – 73, 2005.
[14] W. He, X. Liu, and M. Ren. Location cheating: A security challenge to location-based social network services. In 31st International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), pages 740 –749, 2011.
[15] C. Kim and G. Avoine. Rfid distance bounding protocol with mixed challenges to prevent relay attacks. In Cryptology and Network Security, volume
5888 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 119–133. 2009.
[16] U. M. Maurer. Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher. Journal of Cryptology, 5:53–66, 1992.
[17] J. Munilla and A. Peinado. Distance bounding protocols for rfid enhanced by using void-challenges and analysis in noisy channels. Wireless
Communications and Mobile Computing, 8(9):1227–1232, 2008.
[18] T. S. Rappaport. Wireless communications principles and practices, Second Edition. Prentice-Hall, 2002.
[19] K. B. Rasmussen, C. Castelluccia, T. S. Heydt-Benjamin, and S. Capkun. Proximity-based access control for implantable medical devices. In Proceedings
of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’09, pages 410–419, 2009.
[20] K. B. Rasmussen and S. Cˇapkun. Realization of rf distance bounding. In Proceedings of the 19th USENIX Security Symposium, 2010.
[21] N. Sastry, U. Shankar, and D. Wagner. Secure verification of location claims. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Wireless Security, WiSe
’03, pages 1–10, 2003.
[22] J. H. Schiller and A. Voisard. Location-based services. Morgan Kaufmann, 2004.
[23] D. Singelee and B. Preneel. Location verification using secure distance bounding protocols. In Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems Conference, 2005.
IEEE International Conference on, pages 840–847, 2005.
[24] E. Telatar. Capacity of multi-antenna gaussian channels. European Transactions on Telecommunications, 10(6):585–595, 1999.
[25] S. P. Vadhan. On constructing locally computable extractors and cryptosystems in the bounded storage model. Journal of Cryptology, 17:43–77, 2004.
[26] S. V. Vaseghi. Advanced digital signal processing and noise reduction, Third Edition. John Wiley & Sons, 2006.
[27] B. Waters and E. Felten. Secure, private proofs of location. Technical Report TR-667-03, Princeton Computer Science, 2003.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For any m ∈ {0, 1}k and sampling sequence (S1, . . . , Sk) = Samp(Ur) and define x ∈ {0, 1}n such that
∀i ∈ [n] : xi =
{
mj , if∃j : i = Sj
0, else
.
Since X is (µ, δ)-closely-secure conditioned on Y , we have Ey maxx Pr(dH(X,x) ≤ µn|Y = y) ≤ 2−δn. Define ∆x =
X ⊕x ∈ {0, 1}n and the event Ex to be true when 1n
∑n
i=1 ∆x,i > µ; this gives Ey maxx Pr(Ex|Y = y) ≤ 2−δn. Conditioned
on Ex, the averaging sampler guarantees that
Pr(
1
k
k∑
j=1
∆x,Sj ≤ µ− θ|Ex) ≤ γ.
We complete the proof as
Ey,u max
m
Pr
(
dH(M,m) ≤ (µ− theta)k|Y = y, Ur = u
)
= Ey,u max
m
Pr
( 1
k
k∑
i=1
∆x,Sj ≤ µ− θ|Y = y, Ur = u
)
≤ Ey,u max
m
Pr
( 1
k
k∑
i=1
∆x,Sj ≤ µ− θ|Ex, Y = y, Ur = u
)
+ Pr(Ex|Y = y, Ur = u)
= Ey,u max
m
Pr
( 1
k
k∑
i=1
∆x,Sj ≤ µ− θ|Ex
)
+ Pr
(
Ex|Y = y
)
≤ γ + 2−δn.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: DFA/MFA-SECURE DBV
For any choice of E0 ≤ Emax, the error probabilities pi and pb > pi (at distances dc and ψdc, respectively) are determined
by Lemma 3. For uniform challenge M ∈ bsetk, let X = ModE(M) be transmitted and Y and Z be received at distances
dc and ψdc, respectively. For an honest prover at distance dc, the probability of being rejected equals to the probability that
there are more than βk errors in Mˆ = Demod(Y ). The completeness condition of Definition 4 requires∑
i>βk
(
k
i
)
pii(1− pi)k−i ≤ FR. (10)
For a dishonest prover at distance ψdc, the best probability of being accepted is obtained by choosing Demod(Z) as response,
noting that pb < 0.5, the communication channel is memoryless, and the challenge is uniform. The acceptance probability
hence equals to the probability that there are at most βk errors in Demod(Z). The completeness condition of Definition 4
requires ∑
i≤βk
(
k
i
)
pib(1− pb)k−i ≤ FA. (11)
We let pi < β < pb and apply Chernoff’s inequality to simplify (10)-(11) as
exp
(
− (β − pi)
2
β + pi
k
)
≤ FR, and exp
(
− (pb − β)
2
2pb
k
)
≤ FA.
These inequalities suggest
k ≥ max{ (pi + β) ln(1/FR)
(β − pi)2 ,
(2pb) ln(1/FA)
(pb − β)2 }.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: BRM-DBV - GENERAL INTRUDER
We shall show that the BRM-DBV protocol is complete and is sound against all three attacks. The completeness follows
directly from the DBV protocol Π2. Soundness against DFA and MFA is also implied by TFA-security, because these two
attacks against the DBV protocols becomes special cases of terrorist fraud: DFA can be realized when I does not do any
activity, and MFA can be realized when P follows the protocol honestly. Thus, we only focus on TFA-security, for which we
should assume that P is really located at a distance dr ≥ ψdc.
Without loss of generality, we consider the strongest TFA scenario where all communication to and from I is error-free (it is
literally located pretty close to V) and P’s distance is the dr = ψdc. V’s BRM source sends XO over the PLAN environment,
P observes YO, and I observes (with no error) XO; however, each party can only retrieve k = λn bits from what they observe.
Upon receiving XO (or its binary equivalent O), I retrieves fadv(O) for some function fadv : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k which is
chosen based on the leaked knowledge W about SKe, which is given by P to I. The definition of TFA requires that W does not
increase I’s success chance in impersonation. We give a proof sketch to argue that W cannot help improve the TFA’s success
chance either. (We do not provide a formal proof due to lack of space.) The above requirement on W implies the independence
of W and the averaging sampler output Samp(SKe); otherwise, knowing about the indices of X selected by the sampler
would increase I’s chance in impersonation. We can thus replace the key SKe with a new variable SK′e that is independent of
W and whose values determine all possible outputs from Samp(SKe). This suggests that either SKe is independent of W or
it can be replaced by SK′e that is independent of W . Hereon, we assume that W and hence fadv(.) are independent of SKe.
On the prover’s side, there is the noisy signal YO as well as the secret key SK. Letting V = (fadv(XO), YO,SK) we shall
prove:
Ev max
m
Pr(dH(M,m) ≤ βk|V = v) ≤ FA. (12)
For fixed E0, let pb be the bit error probability in P’s receiver (at distance dr) which is obtained from Lemma 3. Using
Chernoff’s inequality shows that for any µ < pb,
Ey max
o
Pr
(
dH(O, o) ≤ µn|YO = y
)
=
∑
i≤µn
(
n
i
)
pib(1− pb)n−i ≤ exp
(
− (pb − µ)
2
2pb
n
)
. (13)
That is O is (µ, δ1)-closely-secure conditioned on YO, where δ1 =
(pb−µ)2
2 ln(2)pb
. Using Lemma 1 shows us that O is (µ, δ2)-closely-
secure conditioned on (YO, fadv(XO)), where δ2 = δ1−λ is positive because µ+ln(2)λ+
√
(ln(2)λ)2 + 2 ln(2)µλ < pb holds
by the theorem. We now apply Lemma 2 which gives us that M is (β, δ′)-closely-secure conditioned on (YO, fadv(XO),SK),
where β = µ− θ and δ′ = log(γ + 2−δ2n)/k = log(FA)/k as mentioned by the theorem. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: BRM-DBV - SAMPLING INTRUDER
The proof here requires one step modification compared to that of Appendix C (for Theorem 1), which relies on the sampling
intruder assumption. For this intruder, the retrieval function fadv : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k is a sampling function, i.e., fadv(O) = OI
for some fixed set of k indices I = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ [n], which is selected independently of SK. Let I¯ = [n] − I denote the
complement of I . Given (YO, fadv(O)), the adversary first determines OI , calculates O′ = Demod(YO), and uses each bit of
O′¯
I
to obtain some information about the corresponding bit of OI¯ .
For fixed E0, let pb be the bit error probability at distance dr, obtained from Lemma 3. We calculate δ such that O is
(µ, δ)-closely-secure conditioned on (YO, fadv(O)) as follows (we use Chernoff’s inequality since µ < (1− λ)pb).
Ea,y max
o
Pr
(
dH(O, o) ≤ µn|YO = y, fadv(O) = a
)
= Eo′¯
I
max
oI
Pr
(
dH(OI , oI) ≤ µn|O′¯I = o′¯I
)
=
∑
i≤µn
(
(1− λ)n
i
)
pib(1− pb)n−i
≤ exp
(
− ((1− λ)pb − µ)
2
2(1− λ)pb n
)
⇒ δ ≤ ((1− λ)pb − µ)
2
2 ln(2)(1− λ)pb
Applying Lemma 2 lets us conclude that M is (β, δ′)-closely-secure conditioned on (YO, fadv(XO),SK), where β = µ − θ
and δ′ = log(γ + 2−δn)/k which equals log(FA)/k according to the theorem.
